Yet, they credit Turkey with giving them more support than the United Nations, European Union, and Muslim world have, and they rate highly the health and education services offered them in Turkey. Included in this figure, he reported, was more than 6 billion Turkish lira spent on “municipal services” and more than 110 million Turkish lira on “campaigns organized by municipalities,”145 all of which presumably came out of municipal budgets. Less than 1 percent cited the Kurdish problem as the nation’s top problem.

Turkey began consistently to tighten and frequently close its border, leaving countless Syrians on the other side in makeshift camps, clamoring for entry. There was perhaps some exaggeration in the dollar figure.146, Since 2016, Turkey and the refugees have benefited from sizable aid from the European Union, courtesy of a March 2016 EU-Turkey agreement that helps Turkey defray health, education, and other refugee-associated costs. Syrians say that they feel culturally close to the Turks—perhaps for reasons stemming from shared religious values and customs—whereas the Turks tend to say they see the Syrians as culturally alien.133, It is difficult to project how Turkish-Syrian tensions could shape Turkish society over the long term, but there is considerable reason for concern. Given the size of the Syrian refugee community, its lack of obvious alternatives to Turkey, and the potential consequences for Turkey of ignoring the problem, efforts at integration appear to be Turkey’s only logical solution.

Although perhaps a sensible proposition, the author does not give attendance numbers or otherwise back up his claim that Syrians prefer İmam Hatip schooling. Turkish men pay Syrian families a fee for their Syrian brides, while the Syrian families are responsible for one less dependent. The EU’s assistance in response to the Syrian crisis does not only benefit Syrian refugees, but also Lebanese, Jordanians and Turkish people, helping to create job opportunities, infrastructure including schools, as well as better health and water services.

… If there were a war in my country, I would join and not think twice about it.” As is often the case in refugee situations, negative host country perceptions may have little to no relationship to facts but, nevertheless, are deeply held.86, According to a May 2018 CAP-commissioned poll, nearly 80 percent of Turks want the Syrians to return to Syria.87 Broken into categories, one-third said the Turkish government should send back the refugees “no matter what,” while 45 percent said the government should return the refugees only to safe zones set up by Turkey on the Syrian side of the border. The overarching objective of the three Syria Conferences has always been to support the Syrian people and further mobilise the international community behind the work to achieve a lasting political solution to the Syria crisis, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254. See Bezen Balamir Coşkun and Selin Yıldız Nielsen. The author wishes to express appreciation to the following individuals for conversations and/or email communications that added immensely to his knowledge of the issues discussed here: Laura Batalla, Murat Erdoğan, Nigar Göksel, Selin Yıldız Nielsen, Güven Sak, Sabri Sayari, Selin Ünal, and two anonymous Syrian refugees living in Turkey. On the other hand, President Erdoğan reportedly told President Trump that more than 300,000 of the Syrian refugees are Kurds. However, it was not until a series of deadly terrorist attacks in 2015 and 2016, which claimed hundreds of Turkish and tourist lives,14 that the government began serious efforts to limit the refugee flow. The EU’s reconstruction support cannot be invested in a context that would exacerbate pre-war inequalities and grievances. The issue was never discussed in Parliament; the government did not try to convince opposition political parties to endorse its refugee response; and no meaningful informational campaign was undertaken to combat public misperceptions about the refugees. - EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini. Despite the need to prevent terrorism, Turkey continues to admit “Syrians who are in need, emergency patients, wounded and coming for family reunification at its border gates … (as well as those who) come with road transport … from Gaziantep, Hatay, and Kilis border gates,” the DGMM response says. Humanitarian relief agencies have been providing food, water, medicine and other lifesaving aid to more than 90,000 internally displaced people there as well as more than 1 million other residents who had lost access to social services because of the conflict. Many of the displaced people are fleeing south, deeper into Syria, says Aleksandar Milutinovic, Syria country director for CARE. A January 2018 International Crisis Group report noted a meaningful uptick in Turkish-Syrian violence, although the report finds it is not yet at dangerous levels.132 The smooth integration of Syrians into Turkish society is hampered by a profound difference in objectives and perceptions; the majority of Syrians want Turkish citizenship, while the majority of Turks want the Syrians to leave. Many prospective Turkish employers are interested in Syrian workers precisely because they will work below minimum wage and for longer hours than legally allowed—in short, because they can be exploited. As part of this aid program, the European Union funds two major direct assistance programs for Syrian refugees in Turkey: the Emergency Social Safety Net program, which provides support to needy Syrians and their families—more than 1.5 million people, as of January 2019—and the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education program, which provides funding to families who send their children to school and is paid out on a per-student basis, to parents of 410,000 students, as of January 2019. Ankara formalized its temporary protection regime with Article 91 of its LFIP, passed in April 2013, and its Temporary Protection Regulation (TPR), issued in October 2014.31 The TPR includes a right to health and education for those under protection, just as Geneva does for refugees.

However, this is sufficiently blended with the concept of citizenship that most Sunni Muslims who are willing to do so can easily assume unfettered Turkish identity over time.7 The great exception has been the Turkish Kurds. As the Turkish ombudsman’s report cited earlier suggests, doing so serves the interest of social peace, benefiting Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees alike. In Turkey, it was banned in 1926 but never completely eliminated in more conservative parts of society, particularly in the Turkish southeast. leadership and concerted action. Crude analysis of the June 2018 parliamentary elections suggests that the refugee issue had, at most, minimal impact on the results.